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Heart and Self-Consciousness. Or how Feelings Make Part of Human Consciousness*

Corazón y autoconciencia. O cómo los sentimientos forman parte de la conciencia humana

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Abstract

Since Brentano it has been pointed out that conscience is intentional, so it is directed towards an object. This seems clear, given the intentionality of intelligence, and that consciousness is intellectual in nature. However, an author like Levinas has highlighted that consciousness shows a non-intentional element, and Wojtyła, in its turn, denies intentionality to consciousness *as such*, arguing that this trait pertains only to its *acts* of knowledge. From a Steinian concept of intentionality I study the non-intentional side of consciousness, trying to explain how can it be intellectual and non-intentional, and I suggest some kind of feeling entity might be responsible for this special characteristic.

Keywords

Consciousness, feelings, heart, intentionality, Stein.

Resumen

Desde Brentano se ha destacado que la conciencia humana es intencional, lo que implica que se dirige a un objeto. Esto parece claro, dado el carácter intencional de la inteligencia, y que la conciencia es algo intelectual. Sin embargo, un autor como Levinas también ha destacado que la conciencia tiene un elemento no intencional, y Wojtyła, por su parte, niega el carácter intencional a la conciencia *como tal*, concediéndoselo solo a sus *actos* de conocimiento. Partiendo de un concepto steiniano de intencionalidad se profundiza en el aspecto no intencional de la conciencia (más concretamente, de la autoconciencia), se trata de explicar en qué sentido pueda ser intelectual y no intencional, y se apunta a un tipo de sentimientos como posibles responsables de esta peculiaridad.

Palabras clave

Conciencia, corazón, intencionalidad, sentimientos, Stein.

Introduction

The word “conscience” has several meanings. According to Ferrater Mora’s dictionary (2005), we could distinguish: 1) awareness or recognizing of something 2) knowledge of good and evil.¹ The second one is the moral sense of conscience. In this study I will focus on a very specific aspect of the sense 1): the perception of me by myself, sometimes called apperception: In other words, self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*) or self-awareness. An inquiry will be made into whether, in that sense, conscience, beyond its intentionality toward external objects, is also intentional towards the I. If not, how could that be explained?

It is a common assertion of some philosophers (among them Haecker [1934: 146], von Hildebrand [2007: 19, 21], Stein [2004b: 129, 2006: 379, 2008: 120]) that the higher capacities of man are thought, will and heart – their corresponding acts being thinking, willing and feeling.² As well, conscience —not in the moral sense—, according to its etymology, *co-scire*, to know together, has to do with the first of these powers, the intelligence. But it is *just* so? On the other hand, consciousness permits an inward knowledge, so someone could conceive it as a reflex act. But this is not the kind of consciousness dealt with in this article, reflecting on the fact that one thinks or how he is, but consciousness as *being aware* that one thinks or exists. Stein thinks of it as an “inner light” (2004a: 106), and in other place she also compares reason with a natural light (2001: 148). Again, is the nature of consciousness, then, purely intellectual?

1 Entry “conciencia”.

2 This division is already present in Kant, for example in his *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* (2006: 15, 125 and 149), who influences all these authors.

We must consider that consciousness and the possession of an I make us different from animals, and the I, according to Edith Stein (2008: 116), Paul Natorp (1912: 52ff), and Konstantin Österreich (1910: 8ff), is constituted in feelings. So, feelings, in addition to distinguishing us—together with the intelligence—from animals, seem to play some role in our consciousness, since only subjects with an I have consciousness. The aim of this work is to explore the role of feelings in human conscience and to assess whether they can be understood as included in it or not. A purely intellectual consciousness would make us similar to Aristotle's God, the "noesis noeseos" (*Met.* XII 9, 1074b 34 Ross), a thought on thought or a thinking on thinking. While this conception does not sound absolutely incorrect, it seems somewhat cold, at least incomplete. As well, is it our consciousness just "to think about ourselves"? It seems clear that consciousness is not an operation where we would objectify ourselves by thinking on ourselves. Aquinas³ considers it is not an act, but something belonging to the very essence of the soul: "But no habit is required for the soul's perception of its existence and its advertence to the activity within it. The essence alone of the soul, which is present to the mind, is enough for this, for the acts in which it is actually perceived proceed from it" (*De veritate*, q. 10. a. 8). When something is known to the soul, not by any species, but by the very essence, that same essence is in the place of the habit (*Super Sent.*, lib. 1, d. 3 q. 5 a. 1 ad 1). So, not being exactly a habit in the ordinary sense, it can be taken nevertheless in the place of a habit, and can be considered then a consubstantial habit (*Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 3, q. 5, a. 1 ad 2).⁴ Self-consciousness could then be conceived as a faculty of the soul: "omnis proprietates consequens essentiam animae

3 Aquinas does not deal thematically with *self*-conscience, since the *I* was not yet a theme of Philosophy in Middle Ages; consequently, Neuman states that the term "self-consciousness" is not present in Thomas lexikon (2014: 202). However, the subject had been largely reflected upon, only that with other words, and Aquinas gives enough elements in his works to reconstruct a theory of self-awareness, which Neuman does brilliantly in her book.

4 "Quia habitus isti erunt consubstantiales, cum sint in ipsa substantia animae".

secundum suam naturam, vocatur hic potentia animae, sive sit ad operandum sive non” (*Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 3 q. 4 a. 1 co.).

This regarding the intellect. Now, according to Stein and Natorp, the “I” is constituted in feelings (Stein, 2008: 116). They allow us to experience ourselves, because, as one feels, he does not only experience an object, but he himself. That seems to be a way of turning on oneself without objectifying (and thus somewhat spiritually replicating) oneself. One can ask, why could not intellect, pure intellect,⁵ turn to itself without objectifying itself? What is the difficulty? First, the pure intellect does not exist as a floating entity, but it belongs to someone, to an I. So, properly speaking, it is not the intellect that turns on itself, but the thinking subject who turns on himself or herself. Second, it is a task of (human) intellect to divide things in order to understand them, and, in any case, it needs to be directed toward the thing, to pay attention to it, in order to take possession of it. But in the reality of self-awareness, one does not need to pay special attention to himself, but one is simply aware of himself or herself. So, self-awareness is not a *task* of the intellect, neither is something where the I has to put a special effort, attention, or intention. Again, would a being that were *only* and *mere* intellect, be able to be aware of himself? Stein would hold that not, if we understand this with qualifications, as we will see. And, thanks to that turning on himself without objectifying himself, one can be aware of himself without splitting his own *esse*.

In this study I will investigate therefore the structure and ingredient elements of consciousness; to this end, I will primarily draw on several ideas and statements by Edith Stein, with hints taken from Karol Wojtyła, Paul Ricoeur, and other authors, and having in mind two main influences of Stein, namely Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler.

5 With that is meant a hypothetical intellect without feelings, not an angelic intellect.

I will start stating what I mean by heart and what I mean by consciousness, based overall on Edith Stein, but also in other thinkers of the phenomenology field. The same as the organ of thinking is the mind, we can say the organ of feeling is the heart. It must be pointed out that in English the word “emotion” is sometimes used as a kind of hypernym, that is, a general word that covers all affective occurrences, whereas “feeling” is used either as a synonym of emotion, or also to mean the *subjective* experience of an emotion (Lyons 1985: 2-16). Nevertheless, in this study I will use preferably the word ‘feeling’ as hypernym, because ‘emotion’ can connote a vehement or excited mental state, a connotation I want to avoid. Coming back to the heart, in Stein we do not find a thematic approach, but sometimes she relates it to the instance *Gemüt*:

only what is received in the inner of the soul from the external world, what is not merely received by the senses and intellect, but “reaches heart and mind” (*Gemüt*), only that will actually become transformed into the mind, will be actual formative material (Stein, 2000a: 33).

Heart can be regarded as the innermost instance of man. It is an instance deeper than the intellect, which resumes the whole of the person. Stein characterizes *Gemüt* as a place of encounter. In the *Gemüt* we evaluate what comes from outside, through “movements of the mind”⁶ (*Gemütsbewegungen*) and feelings (Stein, 2010: 66 and 2004b: 129). It is the soul of the soul, where the soul is with itself (*bei sich selbst*), where it finds itself as it is and in the state that it has at any given time, where it faces what it receives. This is how Stein describes it in *Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person* (2004b: 86). This German word, *Gemüt*, can be actually translated as soul, disposition, mind, nature, feeling, temper, affection, spirits, words that I include

6 With “mind” as different to “soul” I just try to make the same distinction that is made in German with “*Gemüt*” and “*Seele*”.

here so that the reader can have in mind those connotations.⁷ Stein remarks that sometimes *Gemüt* and *Wille* (“will”) have been regarded as two powers of the soul, sometimes as one and the same power, which proves how close they are (2004b: 129).

Now, according to the above descriptions, the heart appears to be virtually the same as the *Gemüt*, or to overlap with it in many ways: a place of encounter with oneself and of decision-making. If any distinction is to be made, it should be taken into account what Stein says in her book *Science of the Cross* about what she calls “the thoughts of the heart” (I paraphrase): Every soul has an innermost region, and there, its being is life. But this primary life is unknown to the same soul. The so-called “thoughts of the heart” are not thoughts in the ordinary sense, coordinated and understandable, *rational*. They first spring from heart. Later on, they might become noticeable, but this noticing is a kind of consciousness (*Bewußtseins*) much more primitive than the rational knowledge. It is *previous* to the division of soul in powers and acts. This *consciousness* lacks the clarity of the bare rational knowledge, and, on the other hand, is richer than it. That what arises is perceived as bearing a stamp of value on the basis of which a decision is made: the decision to allow *what* is rising to come up or not (Stein, 2002: 157-158). This is very similar to the kind of consciousness that this investigation tries to isolate, because it is still not pervaded by the intellect – in the sense of *rational* power. So, Stein holds there is a kind of consciousness which is not rational. Can be held that this pre-rational consciousness is “spiritual”? I think we can hold that, because it belongs to a spiritual being⁸ in an

7 Langenscheidt, entry “Gemüt”. See also definition in monolingual Duden (1989): “Gesamtheit der seelischen und geistigen Kräfte eines Menschen”.

8 Maybe Stein would not call that spiritual, because for her *spiritual life* starts with acts, and acts are *intentional* living experiences (2010: 35). We must bear in mind the ambivalence *geistig* has in German, which can mean both “intellectual” and “spiritual”. I advocate here a wider sense of the word “spiritual”, because an essential ingredient (i.e., self-awareness) of a spiritual entity (any personal subject) must be capable of being called spiritual, even though it is not itself intentional. In order to realize the semantic breadth of the term, it is worth noting that *geistiges Leben* has been translated as “mental living” in the corresponding work in English: *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities* (2000b: 39). If “spiritual” involves “intentionality”, a structure that makes possible that intentionality must be spiritual too.

essential way. Then, if that “heart consciousness” is related with the higher capacities of man we mentioned at the beginning, *thought*, *will* and *heart*, it is difficult not to characterize that obscure consciousness with an ingredient of “heart-ness”, of spiritual feeling. This does not deny the element of *thought* in that pre-consciousness, it simply points to the existence of an element of feeling. If feeling is present in that pre-consciousness “region”, it will not wonder that it is present as a moment of consciousness itself, of self-consciousness, or in its psychological genetic origin.

Consciousness

Karol Wojtyła understands consciousness as “the «terrain» on which one’s own «I», while appearing in all its proper objectivity (precisely as the object of self-knowledge), at the same time fully experiences its own subjectiveness” (2021: 140). It is a *property* of the action (2021: 130), it does not reach the level of *power* of the man (2021: 131).⁹ He distinguishes two functions of consciousness. I will focus on the first one. According to its first, specific function, consciousness “seems to be only a reflection, or rather a mirroring, of [...] that which «happens» in man, and, [...] of both the fact that man «acts», and what it is he does” (2021: 128). “Consciousness is also a reflection, or rather a mirroring, of everything that man comes into objective contact by means of any (including cognitive) action and on occasion of everything that «happens» in him. Consciousness mirrors all of this”. So, consciousness reflects what happens *in* man, and also what happens in him in relation with the outer world. As well, although consciousness has a cognitive meaning, its original and more specific function is just *to mirror* the inner life of man, either passive or active. Its cognitive trait is not to penetrate in the object or to form it. The cognitive meaning of consciousness

9 Probably he means that it is not one of the three faculties of man according to St. Augustine. These three powers are: memory, understanding and will. According to Wojtyła, consciousness would not be the actualization of any of these, but a property of an action, specifically of the action of the understanding power.

will be manifest in the second function, which is *the subjectivation of what is objective* (2021: 141; italics in original). In any case, Wojtyła is clear in this: the very activity of cognizing, does not belong to consciousness (2021: 129). Consciousness will help in the process of knowledge, but its most specific trait is a mirroring function.

Man not only *acts* consciously, but also is conscious of his action and of who acts – thus, he is conscious of the act and the person¹⁰ in their dynamic correlation. This consciousness occurs simultaneously with conscious action; in a sense, it accompanies that action. It also occurs before and after that action (Wojtyła, 2021: 127; my italics).

“This mirroring [...] is possible only when *we grant consciousness a specific ability to «transilluminate» all that is cognitively «given» to man [...] However, this «transillumination» is not the same as the active understanding of objects*”, says Wojtyła, “it is rather «maintaining the light» needed for objects and their cognitive meanings to be mirrored in consciousness” (2021: 130; italics in original). Wojtyła compares this consciousness with “the same intellectual light to which man owes his traditional definition as *animal rationale*” (2021: 130).¹¹ Edith Stein exposes similar ideas in her work *Einführung in die Philosophie*. According to her, consciousness is not knowledge, if you understand by that to look on the object and place it under universal concepts. There is indeed a knowledge of the consciousness, where the same consciousness is its own object (in acts of reflection). But that knowledge is objectifying: consciousness separates itself in a knowing conscience and a known conscience. To be aware of oneself, however, cannot be thought of as a reflective act that has another act as its object (Stein, 2004a: 106), because, were it so, you could ask again by which reflection act do you know that reflection

¹⁰ This awareness of his action and *his person* is another name of self-consciousness.

¹¹ To my mind Wojtyła is not saying that this consciousness is rational, but that makes it possible to define man as rational, so it founds the possibility of rationality.

act. Rather consciousness (and more precisely, self-consciousness)¹² “is an «inner light», that lightens the flow of experiencing (*Erleben*) and that, in the same flowing, elucidates the experiencing «I», *not being directed towards him*” (Stein, 2004a: 106; my italics). Thus, both authors (Stein and Wojtyła) compare *Bewußtsein* or consciousness with a light. And, in the *Summa*, Aquinas compares intelligence with light: “For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light” (*S. Th.*, I, q. 84 a. 5), so we can conclude that consciousness, though not exactly a rational knowledge, has to do with intellect in general. And this first function of consciousness according to Wojtyła, to mirror and irradiate, allows man to know his own conscience, *it is a condition for the reflection on oneself*.¹³ How can man reflect on himself? Because the original consciousness is retained in the “mode of retention”, so that the experience, that in the reflection becomes objective, coincides with that which was experienced originally (Stein, 2004a: 106). But that reflection on oneself is not the self-conscience: that reflection objectifies, whereas self-consciousness does not objectify the I: Stein distinguishes the conscience of an experience (*Erleben*) from the

12 Because human conscience, the one studied here, includes in itself self-consciousness, as Stein says “es gehört zum Wesen des Bewußtseins, eben Bewußt-sein, d. h. Innewerden seiner selbst zu sein” (2004a: 105). The following words in the body of the text apply specifically to self-consciousness, since there the I is not directed towards himself.

13 In an analogous sense, but from the neuroscience side, Gudín states: “Being conscious is therefore the mandatory requirement for any form of human experience and for knowledge, and any object of experience and any knowledge is produced in the context of a conscious external experience” (2001: 58). From a philosophical point of view, and according to Neuman’s interpretation, Aquinas thinks that the experience of oneself takes precedence over intelligence (2014: 215-216): she bases herself on this text and other considerations: “Si autem considerentur istae potentiae respectu hujus objecti quod est anima, sic salvatur ordo, cum ipsa anima naturaliter sit sibi praesens; unde ex notitia procedit intelligere, et non e converso” (*Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 3 q. 4 a. 4 co.; my italics). Wojtyła would seem to support on the contrary that self-knowledge is the basis of self-consciousness (2021: 134). However, that wojtylian *self-consciousness* is not the mere *awareness of oneself*, but that awareness enriched with all the experiences gathered through self-knowledge and driven back to the conscience by means of reflexivity, so his thought is compatible with Aquinas’.

Reflexion on that experience. The former does not objectify, it simply accompanies the experience (2010: 114).

Consciousness is a light; several authors coincide in that. But the question is, again, how can a man, with this light, with this habitual sense of himself, be present to himself and not objectify himself? Any knowledge of oneself thought of as a reflection could bring about a *regressum in infinitum*, as both Stein and Aquinas point out. We have seen it in Stein (2004a: 106), Aquinas says so in his *Sententiae* (*Super Sent.*, lib. 4, d. 49, q. 1 a. 1).¹⁴ Husserl had dealt with this *regressum* issue in his *Logische Untersuchungen II* (1984: 366-367/2001: 206), where he also denies conscience can be a kind of knowledge (*eine Art von Wissen*), specifically an intuitive knowledge. And Scheler, to avoid this *regressum*, simply denies that an act can be an object (2001: 503).¹⁵

So, self-consciousness is not to know yourself, but a premise of that self-knowledge. Knowing (through objects) is intentional, as phenomenologist philosophers hold. But self-consciousness, awareness of yourself, is just to know you exist? And, *how* do you arrive to this knowledge? Apparently, the immateriality of *intelligence* could be enough to explain a turning on itself without objectifications. But again, here it is not intelligence that turns on itself, but the *I*, and in fact he does not turn, but is just present to himself. How does he or she do it, only by intellectual means? Are not feelings involved somehow?

Feelings and Consciousness

At this point we must ask: what are “feelings”? Andrew Tallon gives the following explanation, based on Ricoeur’s conception: “feeling (emotion) is always an ambiguous mix of affection (as being moved

14 “Si enim intellectus intelligit se intelligere, oportet quod intelligat se intelligere aliquid; et si dicas quod intelligit se intelligere hoc quod est se intelligere, adhuc oportebit aliud ponere, et sic in infinitum”.

15 Wojtyła mentions the “regressum issue” when analyzing the relationship between self-knowledge and consciousness (2021: 134-135).

or touched – a being-affected) and intention (as reference to otherness)” (1997: 8).¹⁶ It has two sides, affection and intention, being-affected (subjective side), and to be directed toward other thing (objective side). Regarding the intentionality of feelings there is some division among phenomenologists. According to Ricoeur they are always intentional (“Feeling, for instance love or hate, is without any doubt intentional: it is a feeling of «something» – the lovable, the hateful” (Ricoeur, 1960: 100),¹⁷ whereas von Hildebrand admits non-intentional feelings. Von Hildebrand recognizes three levels of feelings, bodily, psychic and spiritual affectivity (Hildebrand, 2007: 22ff). Among the psychic ones there are non-intentional feelings, such as bad humor, or a sweet melancholy. They are very close to the specifically intentional and therefore spiritual feelings, but their rank is lower. Could we find a non-intentional feeling in the first function of consciousness? We will see that this is very possible. In any case, it makes sense that feelings are involved in an entity (awareness) that is non-intentional, since they are not necessarily intentional:¹⁸ they are not acts nor are they *always* included in an act, and acts are the only ones intentional by nature. Indeed, act, in modern philosophy, is a spiritual action freely carried out (Stein, 2006: 19). All acts are ‘I’ experiences (1989: 98). In line with this, Österreich conceives feelings as states of the I: “For the present, I dare to say only one thing: feelings are always a state of the ego, not an actual act” (1910: 14).¹⁹ Feelings can then work together, as it

16 See also Tallon (1997: 90, 94ff).

17 Andrew Tallon (1997: 98), who exposes Ricoeur, quotes the French philosopher according to the English translation, *Fallible Man* (reference included at the end of this work). However, I follow as far as possible Ricoeur’s original version, *Finitude et culpabilité. I. L’homme faillible* (1960).

18 Of course, here I am siding with von Hildebrand and understanding “feeling” as a (for him psychic) entity with *no intentionality*. But my bet and proposal is that it could still be called “spiritual”, since, even though it lacks an intentional character, it issues from an I.

19 Stein relies on his work in her doctoral thesis (Stein, 1917: 109).

were, with the intellect to “bring about”²⁰ a non-intentional reality, the awareness of oneself.

As I said, there is no consensus among phenomenologists regarding the existence of non-intentional feelings. Husserl himself thinks that feelings are always intentional. Stein, in my opinion more didactic and clear than her master, gives us a definition of intentionality that helps to understand Husserl’s usage. According to her, intentionality is “to be directed to objects”, and for it to exist you need three elements: an *I* that looks to an object, the *object* to which the *I* looks, the *act* where the *I* lives and directs himself to an object in this way or the other (Stein, 2004b: 80).²¹ And *intentio*, to direct oneself towards something, is described as the fact that the *I* who was living in a flow of data, but not looking towards them, opens his spiritual look and directs himself towards something that comes before him.²² So the *I* is explicitly present and mentioned in that description. The same data have intentionality, but it is an inferior one (2010: 35). The living experience has intentionality because of the *I*, the *intentio* of the *I*.

The concept is the same in Husserl, although it might be worth pointing out that sometimes he seems to “personify” the experience and to make it the one that intends, whereas the *I* is sort of abstracted: the contents of a living experience (*Erlebnis*) are not objects

20 I write “bring about” in inverted commas because I want to avoid the impression that this awareness comes to the subject just by spontaneous generation, or that the individual gives to himself this consciousness: those feelings, spiritual in nature, belong to a spirit, as well as the intellect they impregnate. Self-consciousness does not just “come about” absolutely. The working together of all these dimensions is possible in a subject that is already spiritual, and that spiritual nature can only come from a superior Spirit, with the power to originate another personal spirit. I am just trying to describe the structure of self-consciousness, once assumed that an *I* and feelings are given.

21 An approach by Husserl is: “*the essence of consciousness, in which I live as my own self, is the so-called intentionality*”. Consciousness is always consciousness of something” (1964: 12-13; italics in original). It is not a literal translation, the German goes: “*Die Grundeigenschaft der Bewußtseinsweisen, in denen ich als Ich lebe, ist die sogenannte Intentionalität*” (1950: 13; italics in original).

22 Stein (2010: 35).

intended by the whole, they are not intentional objects²³. Later on, he speaks of “feelings that have really an intentional reference to the object”, and that the “two psychic living experiences [...] *establish (eingehen) an association*” (1984: 403; my italics). With that he is almost personifying the living experiences. Probably it is just a matter of convenience in the expression, but it can dangerously lead to considering conscience as an autonomous subject. In any case, he clearly denies that there are non-intentional feelings. He first affirms the existence of intentional feelings (1984: 402-403), inferring the intentionality from the fact that feelings have as basis representations, and that we can only affectively (*gefühlsmäßig*) refer to the represented objects through the representations intertwined with feelings. But then asks himself whether there are non-intentional feelings (1984: 406): in principle it could seem that the so-called sensorial feelings (*sinnlichen Gefühle*) are of that kind: a pain, for example. It is referred to objects, a pain for getting burned. But then we can see that this sensation of pain is in effect realized within a living experience: so, it is not intentional by itself, but by the fact that it is consciously lived by a person. He concludes therefore, following Brentano, that sensations of pain can be distinguished from feelings of pain, and that if we name both of them with a single word, “feeling”, it is just for a double meaning of language, because in fact they belong to different genera. Feelings, in the strict sense, cannot be but intentional.

The critical point in the intentionality of feelings is for Husserl that they include a representation. This is necessary for objectifying, and intention needs an object. Max Scheler, however, has a different concept of “intentional”. He says: “I have tried to make clear elsewhere the existence of genuine feelings *originally* intentional (that is, not conditioned by a representation)” (Scheler, 1973a: 66, my italics). So for Scheler “intentional” does not need a representation, a feeling *originally* intentional could not have a representation, which is a very different conception from that of Husserl. Scheler regards “intentional” a living experience that is directed and sense-giving (1973b: 260), or that can mean an object and in whose execution

23 Husserl (1984: 382-383).

something objective can appear (1973b: 259). And feelings are not necessarily intentional. He distinguishes intentional “feeling of something” (*Fühlen*) and mere feeling-states (*Gefühlszustände*) (1973b: 255). Those feeling-states are not *per se* intentional. They *can* be an object of a “feeling of something”, the *something* in that “feeling of something”, but they may as well not be objectified. For example, a pain due to a prick. In addition, Scheler links intentionality with a cognitive function, as is logical: the purposeful character of some feelings has nothing to do with their intentional nature or their cognitive functions (1973b: 264). And, in the feeling of the values of what is agreeable, beautiful and good, the intentional feeling reaches a cognitive function that has not in other intentional feelings such as the (objectifying) feeling of states or of soul characters (Scheler, 2005: 12).²⁴

In *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1923) Scheler goes more deeply in the subject and completes the theory of feelings he had outlined in his *Ethics* (1913). He studies now the nature of sympathy or *Mitgefühl* —which in practice is the entity that Stein calls empathy—, the nature of love and hatred, and the perception of someone else’s self, a knowledge for which sympathy and love are essential. Scheler divides the feeling life in four levels or strata: 1) Sensible feelings, 2) feelings of the lived body (as states) and feelings of life (as functions), 3) pure psychic feelings (pure feelings of the ego), and 4) spiritual feelings (Scheler, 2001: 441). From a different point of view, states, functions and acts make up another framework for the classification of feelings: functions and acts are intentional.²⁵ Only states lack an object and are not regarded intentional. So, according to Scheler’s levels, only sensible feelings and feelings of the lived body lack an object and, therefore, an intention that could be directed towards it. Now, if in self-consciousness the I does not take

24 They are not directly Scheler’s words, but a summary of his thought by Vendrell in the foreword of the book. But Gomá (1989: 306) holds the same idea: Scheler assigns intentionality to the feeling “as if it was a conscious intelligence”.

25 Again, I follow Vendrell’s exposition (Scheler, 2005: 14). Pérez (2017: 90) understands functions are non-intentional, based on Scheler (2001: 518-519). I do not enter into an interpretation of this.

himself as an object, and if feelings might somehow be involved in it, those feelings must be of the 1) or 2) levels in Scheler's scheme. But those are feelings immediately related to the body, that a mere animal could also have (setting aside it does not have an I). The same applies to functions, be they intentional or not. And from that level up all feelings are intentional. Therefore, the feeling in which an I is constituted (Stein 2008: 116) simply does not fit in that classification, either because it is not intentional, or because, being spiritual, it is not an act.

Stein makes a cursory classification of feelings in her doctoral thesis, that coincides approximately with Scheler's. The central ideas are that the I is constituted in emotions,²⁶ but those emotions are not of the type of *sensations*, because those result in nothing for the experienced I, and they do not issue from the I. Other feelings are "self-experiencing": *general feelings* and *moods*. But they are not experienced in the surface of the I or in his depth, and expose no levels of the "I". She comes finally to *feelings* in the pregnant sense. In every feeling of this last type, the I is turned toward an object. And they are given to the I in theoretical acts. Thus, they are undoubtedly intentional feelings (1989: 100-101).

The structure of all feelings requires theoretical acts. When I am joyful over a good deed, this is how the deed's goodness or its positive value faces me. But I must know about the deed in order to be joyful over it – knowledge is fundamental to joy [...]. Furthermore, this knowledge belongs among acts that can only be comprehended reflectively and has no "I" depth of any kind. On the contrary, the feeling based on this knowledge always reaches into the "I's" stability (*Bestand*) and is experienced as issuing out of it (1989: 101).

So, in order to notice and feel the I, you need feelings, intentional feelings, that direct you to an object (*vid. infra*); but in that

26 As previously mentioned, "feelings" will preferably be used as a hypernym; however, in this case Waltraut's translation is kept.

act you experience (*erlebt*) that feeling “as issuing out of the I”. I hold that this living experience of the feeling has *in its turn* a feeling component, which is non-intentional toward the I, because the experience is directed towards the value, and the I is exposed only indirectly. *Erleben* is not just a theoretical, purely intellectual act, but an act with a feeling component.

To sum up, for Husserl all feelings are intentional, and intentionality implies a representation; Scheler admits non-intentional feelings—the states—and thinks intentionality does not entail necessarily a representation. And according to Stein for intentionality you just need an *I*, an *object* and an *act*.

For the I to be noticed by oneself you need feelings, but at the same time, for a feeling to be intentional you need at least an I. Once you notice your I, you can start to “build it”, the constitution of the I begins, and this is how the I can be constituted in feelings.²⁷ That “constitution in” feelings in principle needs *not* to have an ontological meaning, it does not mean that a subject without actual feelings (say, a fetus) is incapable of having an I. But in the end, it does have ontological significance for the *activation* of the I, the starting of self-awareness, and of the constitution of the I. In any case, the investigated problem is the kind of feelings involved in this noticing of the I, noticing which can be regarded as the first moment²⁸ of self-consciousness. It happens that the I needs first a direction toward an object, an intentional act, to notice himself. That is how Aquinas expresses it in the words of a fictitious dialogue with Husserl imagined by Stein. Thomas is speaking about immediacy in knowledge:

As immediately evident [...] I considered the fact of existence itself. [...] However, with regard to it [...] we affirm that this fact is not the first thing in time that is actually realized; the original direction of the act is *towards external objects*, and it is only *by reflecting* that we must acquire knowledge of the acts themselves *and of our own existence* (1929: 334; my italics).

27 Or “emotions”, depending on the translation (*Gefühlen*).

28 In the sense of genetic psychological description.

Stein herself goes a step further, and speaks not only of “reflection” but of feeling:

Psychologists distinguish sensations in which I sense “something”, [...] from emotions in which I feel “myself” or I feel acts and states of the “I”. [...] *It is possible to conceive of a subject only living in theoretical acts having an object world facing it without ever becoming aware of itself and its consciousness*, without “being there” for itself. But this is no longer possible as soon as this subject not only perceives,²⁹ thinks, etc., but also feels. For as he feels he not only experiences objects, but he himself (1989: 98; my italics).

So, the first knowledge of our own existence (Aquinas), is in fact acquired through some kind of feeling (Stein).³⁰ And this is seamlessly in line with the Aristotelian principle that every knowledge starts with senses. In the awareness of oneself the I is directed to

29 Note that “perceive” is here on a different level than the “perception of the I” of which Aquinas ends up speaking in *De veritate*. When the object is the I, the sense is deepened and is closer to “experience”, as can be seen in the following note. That experience could not be called “living experience”, *Erlebnis*, because *Erlebnis* is always intentional, but to my mind it shares with it a feeling character.

30 Interestingly enough, in Aquinas there is a slight shift in terminology. In *De veritate* (q. 15, a. 1 ad 6) he says that soul knows itself through itself, inasmuch as to know (*nosse*) is to possess in itself acquaintance/notice of itself (*notitiam sui apud se tenere*). But *nosse* gives ground to *percipere* and *experire* when expressing this self-knowledge (assimilable to consciousness here). In the *Sententiae* Aquinas had used the term “intuitus”: “secundum quod intelligere nihil aliud dicit quam intuitum, qui nihil aliud est quam praesentia intelligibilis ad intellectum quocumque modo, sic anima semper intelligit se et Deum indeterminate” (*Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 3 q. 4 a. 5 co.) “Intuere” is the simplest and most basic way of knowing, without concepts, so it allows to know about the existence, but not to grasp the whole essence. In *De veritate* the most complete text on the subject goes: “I say that the soul is known through its acts. For one perceives (*percipit*) that he has a soul, that he lives, and that he exists, because he perceives that he senses, understands, and carries on other vital activities of this sort” (*De veritate*, q. 10, a. 8 co). Finally, in the *Summa*, which is posterior to *De veritate*, he explains what he understands by *perceptio*: “Now perception implies a certain experimental knowledge [*experimentalem quandam notitiam*]” (*S. Th.*, I, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2. See Pérez (2017: 38-43), from which this idea is taken. What is most interesting is that from pure intellectual verbs and nouns he goes on to use words more easily related to the senses, such as *perceptio* and *notitia*. This is in line with the idea that feelings have a role to play in consciousness (since feelings subsume senses).

an external object —and *there is* intentionality in that—, but at the same time not directed towards himself, so *there is not* intentionality in that. This situation demands a non-intentional entity on which the I can be based. When the I starts to feel himself consciously (i.e., he *erlebt*), he does not take himself as an *object* nor directs to himself through an *act*. I do not hold therefore that for Stein consciousness is non-intentional, but that *one moment*³¹ of consciousness, indispensable for it to be human, namely, self-awareness, is non-intentional.

There is in Stein's extensive work an example of feelings that cooperate with intellect in order to notice ourselves, and these feelings are precisely in the boundaries of our consciousness. As we have seen before, Stein thinks *there are* "thoughts of the heart", and they are noticed (*spüren*) in a certain threshold of the heart. That noticing is a manner of consciousness much more original (*ursprünglicher*) than the rational thinking. And the thoughts of the heart end up being conscious to the subject, because they are noticed. "Noticing" is a verb related to getting information, but also to "feeling". In fact, the dictionary renders *spüren* —the German word Stein uses— into English as "to feel something" or "to sense something", rather than "to notice", the actual word used in the translation.³² This means that those thoughts of heart are in fact *felt* (in some way). This primitive consciousness happens at the heart level, is not "rational" in the sense of conceptualizing, inferential, but its intellectual nature cannot be denied either. Certainly, Karol Wojtyła holds that "man experiences himself [...] mentally, for the nature of consciousness is mental, intellectual" (2021: 147). According to him, consciousness has intellectual nature, but its most characteristic trait is not cognitive, as he had stated earlier (2021: 129) when speaking of its first function. In any case, in this noticing of the thoughts of heart we can see, so to speak, a cooperation and even blending of intellectual and feeling power of man in order to grasp himself or herself. Stein and Ricoeur recognize a sphere where human faculties *are not yet divided*, and that

31 In phenomenological sense.

32 Cf. <https://de.pons.com/übersetzung-2/deutsch-englisch/spueren>, dictionary and translator, or <https://en.langenscheidt.com/german-english/spueren>

is precisely at the heart level. In this borderline between (constituted) consciousness and heart it is therefore logical that intellect and feeling are close united. Ricoeur affirms: “In a static representation the intermediate [the heart] is a «mean», it is «between» two other functions or parts. In a dynamic representation it will be a «mélange»” (1960: 28). And Tallon comments:

How does [Aristotle] see in this “mixed” idea a matrix or fund of mind and will emerging from *thumos* as the cognitional and volitional consciousnesses...? Ricoeur seems to suggest that the affective mix is first a being “mixed up”, a confused fusion that is a con-fusion, a fusion of two before they are distinct (1997: 91; my italics).³³

If there are feelings blended with the intellect power that enable us to start to notice the *thoughts* (or spiritual movements) of heart, there must be some kind of feeling that helps us notice our very *self*. Ricoeur says that “in bearing on qualities felt on the world, *feeling manifests an affectively moved self*” (1986: 126-127).³⁴ It is clear then that emotions manifest the self or I. In order to explain an awareness of oneself, that is, self-consciousness, it is necessary to “put together” the self, the intellect power and the feeling power or affectivity, but none of them with an intentional direction to the *I*. Intellect alone could not explain that sort of unobjectifying noticing of oneself. According to Stein (I extend now the quote),

In “theoretical acts”, such as acts of perception, imagination, relating or deductive thinking, etc., I am turned to an object in such a way that the “I” and the acts *are not there at all*. There is always the possibility of throwing a reflecting glance on these, since they are always accomplished and ready for perception.

33 We could see a similar idea of a midway place, in this case between bodily consciousness and the intellectual-spiritual personality, in Scheler (1954: 33), but for him it would be a place where cases of *Einsfühlung* or “identification” can occur, so it is not exactly the place where self-consciousness starts.

34 “C’est en visant des qualités des qualités senties *sur* le monde que le sentiment manifeste un moi affecté” (Ricoeur, 1960: 100).

But it is equally possible for this not to happen, for the “I” to be entirely absorbed in considering the object. *It is possible to conceive of a subject only living in theoretical acts having an object world facing it without ever becoming aware of itself and its consciousness, without “being there” for itself.* But this is no longer possible as soon as this subject not only perceives, thinks, etc., but also feels. For as he feels he not only experiences objects, but he himself. He experiences feelings as coming from the “depth of his «I»” (Stein, 1989: 98/2008: 116-117; my italics).

Feelings therefore give depth to the I, who is not just a mere “pure I” according to Stein’s conception of “pure I”.³⁵ The self is revealed to the I in the experience of oneself, in the *Erlebnis*, which here means living consciously oneself. *Leben*, from which the term *Erlebnis* stems, means “life”, so *Erlebnis* is a living experience, which only human beings (or spiritual beings) can have. To *erleben* can be conceived as feeling consciously, or as thinking feelingly.³⁶ Self, feelings and consciousness imply each other. Stein holds rightfully that the I is a universal that belongs to every conscience (2004a: 104) (in this case she means human conscience), accordingly, if a being has conscience, and an I, he has feelings too. The acquiring of consciousness happens only in the heart, in a hearted being. As Ricoeur puts it:

35 The “pure I” is a point that irradiates the rays of consciousness, and that has no extension, no quality and no substantiality (Stein explaining Husserl, 2004b: 85). We can see it is a strange concept, a sort of intersection point between lines. In her mature thought Stein criticizes this “mathematical” I, making the case for a qualitative one (2006: 52 and 320). I believe now that Stein was not expounding correctly Husserl when she described the pure I as an entity without *quality*. For him it has no extension, it is immaterial, but in some places, for example in *Ideen II*, you can see that the pure I does have quality: it is the “*sum cogitans*” (Husserl, 1952: 97). Certainly, in (105) he says that “as pure I, it has not inner hidden richness; [...] all richness lies in the *cogito*”, and that could have justified Stein’s understanding. But to my mind this could mean pushing the issue too far, I do not really see in *Ideen II* any statement from Husserl that justifies to understand the pure I as a quantitative-mathematical entity, a mere crossing of living experiences, it rather seems to have some quality, to the extent it looks very much like the personal I: “the personal I [...] at first it seems to be the same as the pure I” (1952: 247; see also: 97-110).

36 Something similar can be seen in Wojtyła: “In this lived-experience, sensation enters consciousness and forms with it, so to speak, one basis of lived-experience” (2021: 339).

The *thumos*³⁷ is properly the human heart [...] We may place the whole median region of the affective life under the sway of this ambiguous and fragile *thumos*, the whole region situated between the vital and *spiritual* affections, or, in other words, all the affectivity that makes up the *transition between living and thinking*, between *bios* and *logos*. It should be noted that it is in this intermediate region that the *self* is constituted as different from natural beings and other selves (Ricoeur, 1986: 162-163).³⁸

The last piece of the puzzle would be to find a feeling that is not intentional, because in feeling oneself or being aware of the self one does not objectify oneself. Von Hildebrand admits this possibility for psychic feelings, as we have seen. In any case, would holding the possibility of a feeling without intentionality contravene the essence of feeling? If von Hildebrand admits non-intentionality for psychic ones (e.g., an indefinite expectation, the feeling of living life to the fullest), I think it could be admitted for a spiritual one. Ricoeur solves this issue otherwise:

The universal function of feeling is to bind together. It connects what knowledge divides; it binds me to things, to beings, to being. Whereas the whole movement of objectification tends to set a world over against me, *feeling unites the intentionality that throws me out of myself, to the affection through which I feel myself existing* (Ricoeur, 1986: 200; my italics).

So, for him the distance created by knowledge is just overcome by feeling. One problem is how could an intentional entity —according to Ricoeur—, feeling, bend another in principle intentional entity, intelligence. Indeed, intentionality implies a conscious division subject-object. For Ricoeur the “feeling”, an intentional reality,

37 As it happens with the German *Gemüt*, this Greek word can be understood in many ways. According to the dictionary Eulexis (see References) it means heart (as the seat of feelings), soul, spirit, mind, character, affection...

38 This was cited in Tallon (1997: 103), but the quote is taken from the original.

unites knowledge and affection. There are two problems here. First, feeling is intentional, knowledge is intentional, and “the affection” is non-intentional. Therefore, this could be applied to the second idea of Wojtyła’s self-consciousness, the one enriched by knowledge and “reverted” to the consciousness. But what about the first function of self-consciousness, which includes and implies to be aware of oneself? It could be identified not so much with the “feeling that unites”, but with the “affection through which I feel myself”. The second problem is the nomenclature: Ricoeur’s “feeling” was defined as a mix of affection and intention (Tallon, 1997: 8). With that definition “feeling” is always intentional, it has an element of intention. But then “affection”, if it is not intentional, would be regarded an element of feeling and not a feeling itself. Now, of the three faculties of man, affection can be related to “heart”, rather than to thought or will. With which general words can we designate then the three realities that stem from these faculties? “Thought”, “will” and “feeling” are the best candidates. The affection of “feeling myself” must be part of “feeling”. In fact, to describe that affection, we use the word “feeling”. It must be concluded that “feeling” can have a general meaning, when used as a hypernym of all entities stemming from the heart, *and in that case it is not necessarily intentional*, and a specific meaning, when the feeling is conscious and therefore intentional.

With two intentional realities, conscious feeling and intelligence, you cannot make a non-intentional one, awareness. Intentionality is not cancelled out by other intentionality as if they were two terms at both sides of an equation. A possible way out is to maintain that, in this case, neither the intelligence nor the feeling are intentional *toward an I*. Intentionality, according to Stein, is the “being directed to objects” of an I. Intentionality implies three elements: the *I* that looks to the object, the *object* to which the I looks, and the *act* where the I lives in every case (Stein, 2004b: 80). Awareness is not an act, but a connatural habit.³⁹ There is an I, but he is not, properly speaking, an object. It can be concluded that self-consciousness does not

39 Neuman (2014: 216, where she quotes *Super Sent.*, lib. dist. 3, q. 5, a. 1 ad 2). See note 4 of this study and the corresponding body of the text.

involve intentionality towards the I. Indeed, as I said, Stein holds that consciousness of oneself “elucidates the experiencing «I», *not being directed towards him*” (2004a: 106; my italics). Certainly in other places she speaks of a double intentionality, when dealing with feelings, as Crespo points out, explaining Stein:

On the one hand, in feeling-perceptions of value the world reveals to us as a world of values: of the pleasant and the unpleasant, noble and mean, [...] inspiring and repellent, useful and harmful, etc. On the other hand, “values reveal us as well something of the same man: a characteristic structure of his soul, which is touched by the values in different depths, with different strength and different duration of effects” (Crespo, 2018: 29).⁴⁰

But here she is speaking of feelings that are acts, so already intentional: “*on the other hand*, [feelings] are a variety of intentional acts, where certain objective qualities are given, that we call value-qualities [...] We should now show that here a spiritual formation takes place in the form of a double intentionality” (2004b: 81; my italics, my translation). In this paper though we are examining other type of feeling: the indirect feeling of the I. It has been explained that, according to von Hildebrand, a psychic state such as bad humor, or a sweet melancholy can be regarded as a non-intentional feeling. Precisely in this same passage of *The Structure of Human Person* just quoted Stein speaks *in first place* of feelings as inner states, where man finds himself with one “mood” (“gestimmtes” findet) or the other (2004b: 81). These are not acts, but states, they are then closer to the feeling element which is not an act and which is sought after as a possible moment of consciousness.⁴¹ The double intentionality she speaks about has to do with feelings that are acts. These acts are

40 Crespo is quoting Stein (2004b: 82).

41 Levinas acknowledges too that this pre-reflexive conscience is not an act (1991: 147), but he conceives it as “pure passivity”, a term with which I do not fully agree. In my opinion its categorization as habit, or better, as the same essence of man in the place and function of a habit, according to Aquinas, is much more accurate.

relevant for the constitution of the *Persönlichkeit*, of the personality, which is “a qualitatively *developed* present «I»” (Stein, 1989: 15; my italics).⁴² But this constitution is a gradual shaping of the person that one is, through the knowledge of oneself and the knowledge of others, and by means of the feedback on myself that others give to me, which I apprehend and incorporate in me through empathy. Stein investigates and elaborates this issue in her doctoral thesis⁴³. Undoubtedly to feel in other and on behalf of other, which Stein holds can be achieved through empathy, enriches a person and allows him to build himself as a better person, someone whose personality has more being. This is an important part of the constitution of the I. But if we seek to determine how a person is aware of himself, this has to do more with the *Personalität* —which could be translated as personhood, in order to differentiate concepts—, the traits that characterize any human being because he or she is a human person. Stein distinguishes these two concepts, following Husserl’s usage. For instance, in this same work on the structure of human being: “Does personhood, the I-form, belong to human nature?” (Stein, 2004b: 84). And further on: “the spiritual soul [...] gives to the whole the character of the personhood” (Stein, 2004b: 99). So personality has to do with what one becomes, through character, the finish point, whereas personhood is a starting point, a premise that any human being needs to have in order to notice himself or herself, and has to do with the metaphysical point of view, with what makes any person a person.

In her analysis of constitution of the human being, Stein studies consciousness according to the second function analyzed by Wojtyła. But she also deals with the *structure* of human being according to the first function of consciousness, to mirror what happens in man and mirror his acting: when she says that the I is constituted in emotions, those feelings *happen* in him. Those feelings help me to discover *my* “I”. But the fact of *feeling myself* when feeling an emotion (e.g., tiredness or happiness) is not an act, it is a habit. When one is aware of

42 Stein (2008: 26): “ein qualitativ ausgestaltetes Gegenwarts-Ich”.

43 See specially Stein (1989: 63ff / 2008: 80ff), for the constitution at psychic level, and Stein (1989: 98ff / 2008: 116ff), for the constitution at a spiritual level.

some feeling, he might be directed towards that feeling, but he is not directed towards himself. That indirect noticing of the I, is it a pure intellectual issue? Or can the heart be involved in that noticing? I appeal to the very experience of the reader. If we were to be aware of ourselves just by the intellect, by an intellectual faculty, that awareness would be somewhat cold. In my own experience, when I am aware of myself, that awareness is not just a cold verification of my existence, a bit like a registrar would register a birth in his record book, but rather it is colored, filled with something else, a kind of warmth. The light with which intellect, and consciousness, have been compared is not a cold light, but a warm light, and that warmth *is inherent* to the light. That warmth can be conceived as some kind of original feeling, some entity stemming from the heart when and to the extent the heart is a same thing with *Gemüt*, when human faculties are not yet divided. Although he is not directly speaking of a feeling aspect of consciousness, these words of Wojtyła are compatible with this notion: “By speaking of the «vitality» *characteristic to consciousness and proper to it*, we do not merely mean the vitality manifested in the form of the stream of consciousness; rather, we attempt to reach the sources of that stream” (Wojtyła, 2021: 139; my italics).

If with Stein we hold that the I conveys life to the living experiences (Stein, 2006: 56-57, 320),⁴⁴ then the I is a source of vitality for consciousness. And if the I is constituted in feelings, these feelings must be also life for the consciousness. Life of the I emerges from the soul, and in the soul he (the I) immerses what he experiences (Stein, 2004a: 147-148). The soul irradiates life too (2004a: 148), which means that human feelings are not just I-feelings, feelings of a purely spiritual being, “angelic” feelings – they have something specifically human, they are *soul* feelings. Since the heart is the ultimate source of emotions (and of thoughts as well, because they start in it before taking a conceptual shape (Stein, 2002: 157-158), in my opinion we can rightly conclude that feelings make up to some

44 To better understand all the relations between the I, the life and the soul in Stein's thought, see Larrauri (2018: 115ff, specially 119ff).

extent consciousness. Self-awareness, self-noticing, includes a moment of “feeling oneself”.

In a collection of essays called *Entre nous. Essais sur le penser-à-l'autre*, Emmanuel Levinas deals with this non-intentional consciousness. He recognizes that consciousness directed towards the world and the objects, structured as *intentionality* (Levinas, 1991: 145), is also, indirectly and as “besides” (or “in addition”, “*de sùrcroît*”, in his words), consciousness of *itself* (*conscience d'elle-même*). (Note that here he is treating consciousness as an autonomous subject—that is why I translate “itself” and not “himself”—, a position rightly criticized by Wojtyła in *The Acting Person*,⁴⁵ although in that study he probably had in mind Scheler’s position. Nevertheless, Levinas immediately says “*conscience du moi-actif*”, consciousness of the active-self). We should say, more accurately, that it is the *I* who is conscious of himself or herself, not the conscience.⁴⁶ Levinas describes this consciousness as indirect, immediate but not intentional, implicit, and accompanying (1991: 146). And he acknowledges, as Stein did for a subject lost in theoretical objects, that a consciousness thrown itself into the world, immersed in it, could be forgetful of the indirect experience of the self:

45 Cf. Wojtyła (2021: 130-131): “Consciousness is not a subsisting subject [...] We still regard consciousness not as a separate reality but only as the subjective content of the existence and action that are conscious [...]. This way of understanding and interpreting consciousness—in the nounal and subjective sense (as we say)—protects us from considering this consciousness to be an autonomous subject”.

46 Let us make the following digression: in English, as in French, it is more common to use “self” (*moi*) rather than “I” (*je*) to indicate the acting spiritual subject when speaking of him in an objective, third-person fashion: every man has a *self*, the self is conscious of himself. This is the usage in psychology, although the morphology of the word does not exactly reflect that the subject is acting, but that we are speaking of him objectively (since “self” or “*moi/moi-même*” are also used in turns that express an action *on* the subject or towards the subject, even though that action springs from the same subject, as in “I comb my-self”, “I look my-self in the mirror”). However, in this writing I tend to use more “I” in that objective, third-person way (as in “every person has an I”)—even though this is not the most usual translation—, in order to highlight *also morphologically* that he is an *acting* spiritual subject, not a subject receiver of the action. In any case, the use of “I” instead of “self” is also seen in the translation into English of Stein’s doctoral thesis, done by Waltraut Stein, Ph.D., on 1964.

Conscience cependant indirecte, immédiate, mais sans visée intentionnelle, implicite et de pur accompagnement. Non-intentionnelle à distinguer de la perception intérieur à laquelle elle serait apte à ce convertir. Celle-ci, conscience réfléchie, *prend pour objets* le moi, ses états et ses actes mentaux. Conscience réfléchie où la conscience dirigée sur le monde cherche secours contre l'inévitable naïveté de sa rectitude intentionnelle, oublieuse du vécu indirect du non-intentionnel et de ses horizons (Levinas, 1991: 146).

Here Levinas speaks of a personal conscience, but the point is that a reflective conscience, were it purely reflective, just focused on the object, could be assimilated in that to a conscience of a psychophysical individual.⁴⁷ With a practical example, a *Homo neanderthalensis* could have a conscience like the reflective conscience described, it could be engrossed in a world of objects, but without finding his I there, simply because he has not an I. Had he an "I", he would discover it when experiencing his feelings as coming from the depth of that I. Feelings and the I imply each other. With an "intentional" conscience but of inferior intentionality, not properly intentional because it does not belong to an I, a subject could be absolutely focused on the objects he poses, even objects belonging to him, such as his arm or his pain, and at the same time would never discover an I there, would be forgetful of an indirect living experience. This indirect living experience (*vécu, Erlebnis*) would be precisely self-awareness, which is an *indirect* experience of the I because it is non-intentional.

To sum up, if there is a non-intentional ingredient of consciousness, if the I is aware of himself but not directed towards himself (in that awareness), it can be postulated, in addition to a non-intentional intellectual I (the main moment of self-consciousness), a non-intentional feeling of the I: only these two elements can make up, as it were, that non-intentional trait of consciousness. And that non-intentional element of consciousness, the awareness of oneself, is in its turn and paradoxically an indispensable to a true intentional consciousness.

47 As can be inferred from Stein (1989: 98), when she tries to determine what is really characteristic of a person in comparison with a psychophysical being.

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