“La realidad habla por sí sola”. Cuando exhibir fuertes convicciones no es propiamente una virtud

  • Pietro Montanari Universidad de Guadalajara
Palabras clave: Creencias, conspiraciones, ideologías, ignorancia, pseudo-racionalidad


El artículo introduce al análisis de las creencias conspirativas y considera la literatura más relevante sobre el tema. El objetivo del escrito es fenomenológico: entender las creencias conspirativas colocándolas en un género más amplio, las creencias conceptuales generales (o, simplemente, creencias generales), cuyas características esenciales son: grandes temas, falacias lógico-conceptuales, pseudo-racionalidad, mala fe y tendencia monológica. Las creencias generales son funcionales a una comunicación sesgada y tendencialmente deshonesta, la misma que las historias conspirativas comparten con extremismos políticos, fundamentalismos religiosos y otros sistemas de creencias excéntricos, cuya finalidad es eminentemente práctica y auto-representativa (no teorética). El artículo se opone a la mera estigmatización del fenómeno y trata más bien de comprenderlo observando una región más amplia y turbia de la experiencia humana, de la que todos somos responsables de alguna manera.


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Cómo citar
Montanari, P. (2023). “La realidad habla por sí sola”. Cuando exhibir fuertes convicciones no es propiamente una virtud. Open Insight, 14(32), 165-212. https://doi.org/10.23924/oi.v14i32.574