Agencia cuasi-moral y atribución estructural en redes neuronales recurrentes: fundamentos para una ética distribuida

  • Fabio Morandín Ahuerma BUAP
Palabras clave: Agentes cuasimorales, ética de la IA, redes neuronales recurrentes (RNN), rendición de cuentas normativa, teoría de la atribución

Resumen

Este artículo defiende la tesis de que ciertos tipos de sistemas de software —en particular los utilizados en procedimientos con implicaciones morales en la vida real, como los que implementan redes neuronales recurrentes (RNN, LSTM, GRU)— deben entenderse como participantes estructurales de la actividad moral humana. Como tales, se califican como agentes cuasimorales apropiados para la evaluación normativa funcional. Esta condición no depende de la consciencia ni de la intencionalidad, sino de su capacidad estructural para producir resultados auditables, inteligibles y causalmente relevantes. A partir de una reinterpretación de la teoría de la atribución desde la psicología social el artículo examina cómo mecanismos técnicos como los gradientes integrados, las capas de atención y la propagación de la relevancia por capas pueden sustentar formas de justificación práctica. Desde una perspectiva metaética argumenta que la atribución estructural permite que estos sistemas se integren en las prácticas normativas humanas, en particular en contextos moralmente sensibles como la asignación de recursos para beneficios sociales, la detección temprana del riesgo de suicidio en plataformas digitales o la moderación de contenido en procesos democráticos; el artículo aborda las limitaciones conceptuales y técnicas de este enfoque incluyendo los riesgos del antropomorfismo funcional, así como la fragilidad interpretativa de los métodos actuales de atribución y la necesidad de preservar la responsabilidad humana; finalmente el artículo concluye que la gobernanza ética de los sistemas de IA debe incluir métricas de rendimiento así como un diseño estructurado para la rendición de cuentas normativa.

Citas

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Publicado
2026-11-14
Cómo citar
Morandín Ahuerma, F. (2026). Agencia cuasi-moral y atribución estructural en redes neuronales recurrentes: fundamentos para una ética distribuida. Open Insight, 17(41), 149-177. https://doi.org/10.23924/oi.v17i41.757
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Estudios