Quasi-Moral Agency and Structural Attribution in Recurrent Neural Networks: Foundations for Distributed Ethics

  • Fabio Morandín Ahuerma BUAP
Keywords: AI ethics, attribution theory, normative accountability, recurrent neural networks (RNNs), quasi -moral agents

Abstract

This article defends the thesis that certain types of software systems—particularly those used in procedures with real-life moral implications, such as those implementing recurrent neural networks (RNNs, LSTMs, GRUs)—should be understood as structural participants in human moral activity. As such, they qualify as quasi-moral agents appropriate for functional normative assessment. This status depends not on consciousness or intentionality, but on their structural capacity to produce auditable, intelligible, and causally relevant outcomes. Starting from a reinterpretation of attribution theory from a sociopsychological perspective, this article examines how technical mechanisms such as integrated gradients, attention layers, and layered relevance propagation can support forms of practical justification. From a metaethical perspective, it is argued that structural attribution allows these systems to be integrated into human normative practices, particularly in morally sensitive contexts such as the allocation of resources for social benefits, early detection of suicide risk on digital platforms, or content moderation in democratic processes. The article addresses the conceptual and technical limitations of this approach including the risks of functional anthropomorphism or the interpretive weaknesses of current attribution methods and the need to preserve human responsibility. Finally, the article concludes that the ethical governance of AI systems must include performance metrics as well as a structured design for normative accountability.

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Published
2026-11-14
How to Cite
Morandín Ahuerma, F. (2026). Quasi-Moral Agency and Structural Attribution in Recurrent Neural Networks: Foundations for Distributed Ethics. Open Insight, 17(41), 149-177. https://doi.org/10.23924/oi.v17i41.757