The Neo-Humean Conceptions of Practical Rationality. A Critique of Warren Quinn’s Argument
Abstract
Received: 22/10/14 • Accepted: 29/03/15Warren Quinn has proposed an argument to reject the conceptions of practical rationality often referred as “Neo-Humean”; however, his argument is defective. In this paper I reconstruct Quinn’s argument and I present reasons to demonstrate why it is unacceptable.References
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