The Psychological Origin of Empirical Concepts in the Critique of Pure Reason

  • José María Llovet A. Universidad Panamericana
Keywords: Empirical Concepts, Faculty of judgement, Schematism, Subsumptio

Abstract

Received: 25-10-2018Accepted: 07-03-2019 How do empirical concepts are, according to Kant, originated in the understanding? In this paper I want to show that the construction of empirical concepts is a task that corresponds to the schematism of the faculty of judgement, and that this construction should not to be identified, as it is usually done, with the process of comparison, reflection and abstraction explained by this author in the Logic Jäsche. It is rather by means of a psychological process that certain representational content of sensible nature is «intellectualized» —through what I call empirical schematism— to originate the empirical concept. According to my reading, schematism, as a capacity, not only makes possible the application of a category to an intuition, but it is responsible also of the construction and of a further application of empirical concepts to intuitions. 

Author Biography

José María Llovet A., Universidad Panamericana
Profesor investigador del Departamento de Humanidades y de la Facultad de Filosofía

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Published
2019-06-12
How to Cite
Llovet A., J. M. (2019). The Psychological Origin of Empirical Concepts in the Critique of Pure Reason. Open Insight, 10(19), 81-98. https://doi.org/10.23924/oi.v10i19.323