The Definition of Modulation and its Reduction Sentences
Abstract
Modulation is an essential concept in the theory of mental models. According to this theory,sentences in natural language are linked to possibilities. However, the meaning of expressionsand the situations in which they are used can cause changes in those possibilities. The theorycalls ‘modulation’ to that phenomenon. Some of its defenders (Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, andGoodwin) even gave an explicit definition of it. Thus, the main aim of this paper is to addressthat definition in order to check if it follows or not the criteria proposed by Carnap fordefinitions and reduction sentences. The conclusion is that, although the definition ofmodulation in the theory of mental models is very abstract, it seems to fulfill those criteria.References
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