Reply to "A Critique to McDowell's Kantian Argument against Animal Perception"

Abstract

This is a reply to A Critique to McDowell's Kantian Argument against Animal Perception, by Jorge F. Morales Ladrón de Guevara (2015). First, it values Morales attempt to explain animal perception and his use of McDowell's argument and Millikans possition on concepts. It concludes that, even if he begins to realize that the solution to the problem is problematic that is because it is already problematic in the way in which the terms of the the problem are exposed, Ladrón de Guevara does not abandon this sort of explenaition, already problematic in Kant's argument, which Gensollen explains and distinguishes from those of McDowell and Gievara. Then, he brings back the broader panorama in which this question is framed and reformulates it while asumming the inevitable antropologization of animal behaiviour, since it can not be but refered to human cognitive hardiwire. Therefore, he proposes that the problem should be reframed and tryes to show a better way by following certain Wittgenstein intuitions on the criteria that should be used to distinguish animal behaviour –and that we may attribute to prelinguistic humans–, from that adopted by human way of life, which is a more relevant criteria.