Diseccionando el problema de la no-identidad
Resumen
El problema de la no-identidad es el problema de explicar por qué algunos “actos de creación” son moralmente incorrectos. Muchos filósofos han intentado encontrar una solución a este problema. En este artículo, exploro un enfoque diferente. Mi objetivo no es ofrecer una solución novedosa al problema de la no-identidad, sino más bien un método diferente para abordarlo. El problema de la no-identidad parece irresoluble cuando asumimos que existe un único problema y una única solución. Por lo tanto, divido este problema en tres problemas diferentes: el “problema del daño no comparativo”, el “problema de la no privación” y el “problema del daño al creador”. Analizo estos problemas por separado y exploro posibles soluciones.Citas
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