Conditional, Modus Tollendo Tollens, Non-Axiomatic Logic, physical obligation, Stoic criterion.
Resumen
La literatura en el área de la ciencia cognitiva informa que las personas solo aplican Modus Tollendo Tollens en algunos casos. Un caso representativo en el que los individuos aplican tal esquema lógico es cuando la premisa condicional consiste en una obligación física. En este trabajo, trato de mostrar que una lógica no axiomática puede realizar inferencias de Modus Tollendo Tollens solo en situaciones similares a esa. La clave reside en que el condicional sea coherente con el criterio estoico. Ello permite considerar la negación del consecuente y la negación del antecedente como cláusulas en una misma afirmación de implicación con la frecuencia más alta.Citas
Braine, M. D. S. & O’Brien, D. P. (1998). The Theory of Mental-Propositional Logic: Description and Illustration. M. D. S. Braine & D. P. O’Brien (eds.), Mental Logic. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers: 79-89.
Byrne, R. M. J. (2005). The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Byrne, R. M. J. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2009). ‘If’ and the Problems of Conditional Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Science, 13(7): 282-287. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.003.
Cicero (1991). De Fato (On Fate). Ed. & trans. R. W. Sharples. Liverpool University Press.
Cramer, M., Hölldobler, S., & Ragni, M. (2021). When are Humans Reasoning with Modus Tollens? Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 43(43): 2337-2343. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9x33q50g
Diogenes Laertius (1964). Vitae Philosophorum. Ed. H. S. Long. The Clarendon Press.
Gould, J. B. (1970). The Philosophy of Chrysippus. State University of New York Press.
Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics, and Inference. Psychological Review, 109(4): 646-678. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.109.4.646.
Lenzen, W. (2019). Leibniz’s Laws of Consistency and the Philosophical Foundations of Connexive Logic. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 28(3) 537-551. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2019.004.
López-Astorga, M. (2015). Chrysippus’ Indemonstrables and Mental Logic. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 15(43): 1-15. https://doi.org/10.5840/croatjphil20151511.
(2025). Modus Tollendo Tollens with Obligation Conditionals: Towards a Deontic Inheritance Logic Respecting the Stoic Criterion. Schole, 19(1): 77-94. https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/246470.
Sedley, D. (1984). The Negated Conjunction in Stoicism. Elenchos, 5: 311-316.
Sextus Empiricus (1933). Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Outlines of Pyrrhonism). Trans. R. G. Bury. Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library).
Wang, P. (2006). Rigid Flexibility: The Logic of Intelligence. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5045-3.
(2011). The Assumptions on Knowledge and Resources in Models of Rationality. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 3(1): 193-218. https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000686.
(2013). Non-Axiomatic Logic: A Model of Intelligent Reasoning. World Scientific. https://doi.org/10.1142/8665.
(2023). The Role of Copulas in Reasoning. Temple AGI Team. Temple University: 1-12. https://cis.temple.edu/tagit/publications/TAGIT-TR-17.pdf.
