Aburrimiento y ocio: De lo desagradable a lo agradable
Abstract
Recently, in philosophy, what has been attractive about boredom has been the negative effects it can have on the people who experience it. In this article, contrary to this perspective, we deal with what boredom is and if there can be positive effects. As a starting point, we consider boredom to be an unpleasant affective experience. Given this characteristic of boredom, this affective experience motivates the subject who experiences it to look for ways to eliminate it. After this characterization of boredom, we argue that it not only motivates negative activities to eliminate it, but also positive activities. One of these positive activities is leisure. Regarding leisure, we developed the idea that it is an activity that promotes pleasant affective experiences and is a good candidate for mitigating boredom, since it allows the transition from an unpleasant affective experience to other pleasant ones. Contrary to what is normally thought about leisure as a harmful activity, in this article we intend to show that this is a positive activity for those who carry it out. The way in which leisure is beneficial is that it can contribute to the cultivation of certain virtues and, in this way, to the flourishing of people.References
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